Given the recent enactment of the ADA Amendments Act, this article analyzes a Rawlsian philosophical framework with which to view society's treatment of people with disabilities. Allocation of resources remains a pervasive concern of economists and attorneys alike. Need, merit, and market compete as means by which to decide who should receive what benefits. This article concludes that while economics can play a powerful role in the initial allocation of limited resources, there remains a multifaceted federal role to confront discrimination and promote equity.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") Amendments Act ("ADAAA") went into Eleven percent of students in higher education have disabilities, 6 and ten percent of these students have learning disabilities. 7 A significant level of awareness has been raised concerning the needs of people with disabilities, yet increased visibility and legal protections have been met with strong resistance. While disability advocates speak of fundamental civil rights, opponents speak of economic costs. Law and economics can provide much needed guidance based upon well-reasoned theories and have contributed immeasurably to the sound application of laws and policies. Law and society scholars have provided countervailing analyses that remain mindful of the need for humane laws and policies.
This article begins by offering a philosophical framework with which to view society's treatment of people with disabilities. In doing so, Part II attempts to balance the predominantly economic approach by which disability issues have been assessed. Part III then directly addresses the economic way in which the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA") 7 U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-33, supra note 6, at 11. (noting that "the return of veterans with a variety of conditions ranging from mobility impairments to post traumatic stress disorder will present new challenges for colleges and universities. The Post-9/11 Veterans Educational Assistance Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.110-252, 122 Stat. 2357 (codified at 38 U.S.C. § 3313 (2008)), provides funding for tuition and fees, housing, and other assistance for returning veterans. This is likely to increase the number of individuals on campus returning from active service. Not only might the services they request be challenging, but there may be legal issues about documentation. Individuals returning from active service may not be able to get the traditionally required documentation quickly from the military to justify an accommodation, and institutions will need to determine whether they can adapt their policies to this new population"); Rothstein, supra note 6, at 873; see also Paul D. individuals who fall outside of IDEA protection once they reach the age of twenty-one. Many students in this situation have turned to Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 9 In the postsecondary context, courts have struggled with the level of protection that the Rehabilitation Act provides. Instead of explicitly addressing economic costs of compliance, much of the analysis in this area has revolved around the clarification of who is "otherwise qualified." Part IV addresses the intense debate over legislative language that has continued, despite a Congressional effort to strengthen its mandate to eliminate discrimination against disabilities by enacting the ADA. 10 In the context of higher education and professional entrance examinations, there has been less mention of direct cost benefit analyses. Instead, the debate has revolved around academic standards. Beneath this discussion, however, there is an economic productivity debate. The following analysis focuses on the economic undercurrent that has pervaded the process of establishing and implementing civil rights for people with disabilities. This article concludes that while economics can play a powerful role in the initial allocation of limited resources there remains a multifaceted federal role to confront discrimination and promote equity.
II. A PHILOSOPHICAL FRAMEWORK WITH WHICH TO ASSESS DISABILITY LAW
The American legal philosopher, John Rawls, described a state of nature in which individuals have complete freedom within the following hypothetical societal framework.
11
People are initially identical with regard to physical strength, financial security, religion, race, etc. 12 Moreover, these fungible individuals have no idea what they will become in the future. COMMENT. 527, 530 (1995) . 13 Id.
Given these two basic tenets, Rawls predicted that the rules people would establish would be fair because no one would be able to skew them to benefit a given individual circumstance. 14 In this way, we can assess our own laws by considering whether a given rule would have been agreed upon in Rawls' state of nature.
Disability legislation, such as the ADA, holds up very well if such a Rawlsian comparison is made. In fact, the disability field provides an excellent real-world scenario for Rawls' hypothetical decision-making process since no one knows whether they will have to contend with a disability in the future. 15 Since our ability to determine whether or not we would individually benefit from disability legislation mirrors Rawls' state of nature, it is not surprising that ADA provisions in many ways reflect an undifferentiated decision-making process. Without knowing one's future, individuals would like to be assured that if they acquire a disability in the future, society will provide basic accommodations. Similarly, if they decide to be employers in the future, these same individuals would want to be assured that accommodating disabilities would not be exceedingly expensive. 16 Thus, Rawls provides a rationale for moving beyond a utilitarian discussion of whether the ADA's financial costs outweigh its financial benefits. 17 As
Popiel notes,
The fact based utilitarian balancing act does not define fundamental fairness. If the provisions of the ADA pass Rawls' reason based state of nature test, they are just, and there is a strong argument for retaining them in spite of their cost. Our society glorifies the economic marketplace; but, in thinking about the worth of laws, marketplace analysis has its limits.
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Much of the criticism of disability legislation is couched in the argument that the costs outweigh the benefits. Cries that disability provisions such as the ADA are too expensive have Popiel goes on to point out that there are other expenditures for which society is willing to pay that can be extremely costly. For instance, in the context of providing fair trials for criminal defendants, looking solely at financial costs rather than the central issue of fairness is likely to lead to a substantial reduction in procedural protections. The fact that we do not perform a pure dollar and cents analysis in ensuring the right to a fair trial indicates that empirical reasoning is not the only grounds upon which we make decisions. Communities allocate resources based upon a combination of need, merit, and market. In the context of recognizing reasonable accommodations for individuals with disabilities, an even playing field can be established by interpreting and implementing federal legislation in a manner that balances efficiency and equity.
III. A PARADIGM SHIFT IN ATTITUDES TOWARDS DISABILITIES
Societies throughout history have often excluded or ignored people with disabilities.
Misconceptions of an inability for people with disabilities to contribute to society have fostered continued discrimination. The piecemeal approach in which disability legislation has been enacted provides a record with which to trace the gradual transition in perspectives. 19 Id. at 529.
The United States has come a long way in its treatment of people with disabilities. If sufficient funds are not available to finance all of the services and programs that are needed and desirable in the system then the available funds must be expended equitably in such a manner that no child is entirely excluded from a publicly supported education consistent with his needs and ability to benefit there from. The inadequacies of the District of Columbia Public School System whether occasioned by insufficient funding or administrative inefficiency, certainly cannot be permitted to bear more heavily on the 'exceptional' or handicapped child than on the normal child.
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This language in Mills and the protection outlined in PARC became instrumental in the creation of subsequent federal legislation.
In 1975, Congress passed the Education For All Handicapped Children Act ("EAHCA"). 37 Both the House and the Senate reports attribute the impetus for this act to the two federal court judgments previously discussed, PARC and Mills. 38 Most importantly, the term "appropriate" apparently came from these cases. In the PARC case, the district court required that handicapped children be provided with "education and training appropriate to [their] learning capacities" 39 and in Mills, the district court referred to the need for "an appropriate educational program." 40 The EAHCA was amended in 1990 and renamed the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA").
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C. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA")
Despite the growing realization that children with disabilities could benefit educationally from being in the regular classroom, many states continued to deny educational services on the basis of cost and institutional difficulty. In the early 1970s, it was estimated that one to two 36 Id. at 876. 
Conflict between the Traditional Educational System and IDEA
Beyond the misconceptions people have about disabilities, acceptance of IDEA is further hindered by the fact that the legislation is contradictory to the system in which it has been implemented. IDEA introduces a needs-based approach into a merit-based educational system.
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Under the statute, the role of educational merit and needs are reversed. That is to say, the special needs students who have the lowest performance often receive the most resources.
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While IDEA calls for an individualized educational program for a special needs student, school systems are based on a system of standardization in which a set of uniform educational opportunities is provided. 48 In such a system, the ideal goal is to become blind to individual backgrounds. In this respect, educators may see the inclusion movement as a way to bridge this Syndrome child benefits from socialization opportunities in the regular classroom, while a child with a mild learning disability benefits from separate, remedial academic skill-building. Those seeking socialization can benefit from inclusion but this should not be grounds for insisting that children who are seeking the same educational goals as their non-disabled peers can equally benefit from inclusion. Watering down a concept so that it can be learned within the constraints of the traditional classroom does not help the latter. The basis of inclusion is a modified curriculum, essential for some children with disabilities and inadequate for others.
IDEA brought a compulsory funding requirement into a political system of resource allocation-a system in which negotiations determine how much money goes where. 49 The following political disadvantages facing special needs students at the local level indicate why Congress deemed it necessary to ensure their individual rights. Discomfort and prejudice toward people with disabilities remains widespread. Greater understanding is hindered by the reality that teachers and administrators are overburdened and are already struggling to adjust to funding shortages, while juggling increasingly overcrowded classrooms, high student-teacher ratios, and outdated facilities. 50 Despite the need to protect children with disabilities from systematic discrimination, introducing federal control into a system historically run by state and local 49 Id. at 21. 50 Id. at 23.
decision-makers increased the animosity of schools toward special education. 51 When public education was first created in the United States, decisions were made on a local level by parents and the local government. 52 During the nineteenth century, schools were consolidated and increasingly made accountable to states. 53 In contrast, the uniform federal procedures established under IDEA limit local autonomy. This was a change in the role of the federal government, which had traditionally been concerned with increasing access to education rather than setting standards for the content of educational programming. 
Funding Special Education and the Complexity of Disability Evaluations
Realizing that IDEA created an expensive compliance burden for states, Congress incorporated a partial funding mechanism into the legislation. 55 This federal aid would not compensate for all the costs of compliance but it was hoped that the money would ease the burden of providing evaluations and new programs and make districts more willing to change organizational routines and attitudes. As a result, schools receive special education funding in proportion to the number of children identified with disabilities. 56 Linking funding to the labeling process, however, does not give schools the additional incentive to make sure services are appropriate.
A common criticism of special education is that labeling drives the services. That is to say, a school's access to funding affects a child's eligibility and placement recommendations.
There is a disincentive to provide for new disabilities because each new category dilutes the funding available to existing programs. provisions with those allocated to non-disabled children or they will resist accommodating special needs students because there is no pressure to do so or because the legal provisions are impossible to comply with, given budgetary constraints. Third, legal objectives generally do not address the expense of compliance. As a result, districts opt for surface compliance. In assessing the merits of such compliance, however, it is important to realize the validity of the competing interests. The educational rights of non-disabled students, normal working hours, a teacher's ability to teach effectively, and efficient use of taxpayers' money are not discriminatory objectives. Assessing them, however, does not necessarily mean giving them a higher priority than the needs of children with disabilities. 
An Economic Model for Allocating Special Education Services
Maximizing efficiency between two populations of children, those with disabilities and those without disabilities, is a function of schools and parents. In identifying a source of market failure in this context, this Article focuses on maximizing the efficiency of education for all children. Schools and parents become primary decision-makers, each of whom must maximize their objectives subject to their respective budgets. As rational decision-makers, parents seek to maximize their utility. They do this by maximizing educational opportunity for their child(ren)
given their budget constraints. Similarly, as rational decision-makers, schools seek to maximize educational benefit across the two populations of children: those with regular educational needs and those with special needs. Conversely, schools must analyze their opportunity cost of providing educational services to non-disabled children, given the externality of future cost to society of individuals with disabilities.
What incentives do schools have to spend more money on special education now to save costs for other sectors of the society later? Are funding patterns toward education efficient,
given the crucial role human capital plays in our economy? Should each student be competitive in getting a good job or simply able to obtain economic survival? Is it the school's responsibility to prepare all its students for higher education or should vocational training be the objective?
Must reading and spelling be mastered perfectly before pursuing abstract ideas? The answers to these kinds of questions greatly effect what are the perceived needs of a child. Furthermore, perspectives on a child's needs will vary depending on whether the school takes a short-term perspective of a school year or a long-term perspective of the life span of the special needs person. Do the opposing goals of schools and parents create a paradox of compensation or can special education law create efficient incentives for both schools and parents? Investing in education can reduce support cost later on. A given school, however, does not directly benefit from the costs that are saved in the individual's adult years. Therefore, there is a lack of local incentive to pay the price of benefits to other sectors of society in the future. As funding for education continues to decrease in relation to the demand for services, the controversy over resource allocation mounts. interpreted IDEA to require schools to provide merely "adequate" educational benefit. 64 Mr. and
Mrs. Rowley sought a sign-language aide for their daughter, Amy. 65 She had minimal residual hearing but was an excellent lipreader. 66 As plaintiffs on Amy's behalf, her parents argued that refusing to provide Amy with a sign language interpreter when she entered first grade was a denial of a "free appropriate public education" under IDEA. 67 The court found that Amy performed better than average in the class and was advancing easily from grade to grade, despite understanding less than half of what went on in the classroom. 68 There was a clear disparity between Amy's actual achievement and potential. On these grounds, the district court decided that Amy was not being provided a "free appropriate public education." 69 The court defined the latter as "an opportunity to achieve [her] full potential commensurate with the opportunity provided to other children." 70 The Supreme Court, however, disagreed with the lower court's ruling that Amy should be provided with a sign language interpreter. 71 Instead the Court found that since she was receiving an "adequate" education, was performing above average work, and was receiving some personalized instruction and services the lower court should not have found that IDEA required anything further.
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In his dissent, Justice White disagreed with the Court's conclusion that IDEA only mandated "adequate" educational benefit. 73 He pointed out that Congress did not intend courts to end all inquiry if a child is performing on grade level. In fact, Congress repeatedly used the term "full" rather than anything that could be interpreted to mean "adequate." As Justice White explains,
[t]he Act itself announces it will provide a "full educational opportunity to all handicapped children" 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2)(A) (emphasis added). This goal is repeated throughout the legislative history, in statements too frequent to be 'passing references and isolated phrases' . . . . Congress wanted not only to bring handicapped children into the schoolhouse, but also to benefit them once they had entered.
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Justice White goes on to criticize the majority opinion's use of the PARC and Mills cases. 75 He contends that, the fact that "these decisions served as an impetus for the Act does not, however, establish them as the limits of the Act."
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Allocating resources for special education appears to create a paradox of compensation.
If the law requires that a child be afforded the maximum development possible then schools have an efficient incentive to identify and serve children with disabilities. Parents, on the other hand, do not have efficient incentives. They do not have anything obligating them to make sure the cost of a service is offset by the benefit to their child. On the other hand, if the law only requires 71 Id. at 210. 72 Id. 73 Id. at 215-20. 74 Id. at 213. 75 Id. at 215-20. 76 Id. at 214.
that "adequate" educational services which offer merely "some" educational benefit be afforded to a special needs child, then parents are the ones who have efficient incentives to find out what services are essential. Schools, on the other hand, do not have efficient incentives to provide services beyond the first increment of educational benefit. The incentive on the part of schools to provide as little as possible, is what concerned Justice White in the Rowley case and has led several states to establish standards above the Rowley precedent of "adequate" educational benefit. 77 The following section seeks to strike a balance between educationally beneficial services and those ensuring maximum possible development.
Proportional Quality
IDEA requires that every child has a right to a free and appropriate education in the least restrictive setting possible. 78 Yet, interpreting these provisions can be confusing. For example, does a child have access to special education if there is a testable disparity between achievement and potential, or merely if that disparity is below grade level (i.e., the underlying issue in the Rowley case)? A general misunderstanding of disabilities aggravates such complexities.
Disabling conditions do not preclude students from performing above grade level. In fact, it has been estimated that one sixth of the population of gifted children have disabilities.
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Currently, enormous but inadequate amounts of money are being invested in special education. These funds undoubtedly help a large number of children. It is important, however, 77 See id. 78 "Each public agency must ensure that-(i) to the maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities, including children in public or private institutions or other care facilities, are educated with children who are nondisabled; and (ii) special classes, separate schooling or other removal of children with disabilities from the regular educational environment occurs only if the nature or severity of the disability is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily." 20 U.S.C. §300.114(a)(2). 79 to make sure the value of a service to a given child is greater than the cost of the service. This is not synonymous with determining that the value to the child is greater than the value of an alternative resource to non-disabled children. For example, if an aide for a special needs child can only be afforded at the expense of a classroom chalkboard, it makes sense to ensure that the benefit of an aide to the child with a disability justifies the cost of the aid. While administrative biases and discrepancies in defining value (i.e., economic productivity verses individual dignity) can make the benefit hard to calculate, it is clear that the service should be worthwhile to its recipient. In contrast, determining whether the special needs child can use the aide more productively than the other students can use the chalkboard legitimizes replacing the rights of less highly valued individuals with the rights of more highly valued individuals. To give up something in the present in order to receive something greater in the future may be efficient. To require one group of children to sacrifice something so that another group can have something, even if the gain is greater than the loss, is not efficient. Pareto Efficiency requires that the party not being made better off is at least not made worse off. 80 Unlike a strict cost-benefit analysis,
proportional quality programming does not compare services on the basis of goals but rather sees each group of children as having entitlements to the same degree of respect and a right to learn.
While it is unrealistic not to consider costs in determining special education services within a system that is forced to weigh the costs and benefits of every other aspect of its program, the issue of cost should be confronted directly, not disguised under the educational term "least restrictive environment." Cost considerations must be made on a quality basis. If schools only compare costs, they will continue to systematically deny special education 80 Pareto Efficiency or Pareto Optimality "occurs when resources are so allocated that it is not possible to make anyone better off without making someone else worse off." See OECD, Glossary of Statistical Terms, http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=3275 (last visited 05/31/11).
programs on the basis of higher cost. If sacrifices must be made, they should be made across the board instead of always being made by a single group of students. Therefore, before costs are used to legitimize not providing an educationally beneficial special service, schools have to offer special needs students a program that is comparable in quality to the program available to nondisabled students.
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A proportional quality approach can narrow the discrepancy between the nondiscriminatory mandate of Section 504 and the affirmative requirements imposed by IDEA.
A child with a disability must be able to benefit from the instruction under IDEA. Section 504, on the other hand, merely requires that a handicapped child be offered the same educational access as a non-disabled child. Additionally, Section 504's protection does not bring money with it. Federal funding determines whether Section 504 is applicable but the money does not have to be disability funding. Section 504 is a civil rights law rather than a funding law. While IDEA provides more detailed provisions for those who qualify, Section 504 extends to a range of individuals with disabilities who are not protected under IDEA. Many college students, for example, find that the accommodations that they received throughout elementary and secondary school are no longer protected in post-secondary pursuits since IDEA only covers individuals with disabilities up to the age of twenty-one. 82 The following discussion focuses on the struggle that post-secondary students have experienced.
D. An "Otherwise Qualified Individual" Under Section 504
One of the greatest obstacles that post-secondary students have faced pursuant to Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, has been to successfully argue that they are an "otherwise 81 If the institution submits undisputed facts demonstrating that the relevant officials within the institution considered alternative means, their feasibility, cost and effect on the academic program, and came to a rationally justifiable conclusion that the available alternatives would result either in lowering academic standards or requiring substantial program alteration, the court could rule as a matter of law that the institution had met its duty of seeking reasonable accommodation.
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Wynne argued that he failed several first year medical classes as a result of having dyslexia and that, therefore, the university discriminated against him in not modifying the standard multiple- 90 Id. at 300 (finding Tennessee's medical policy, which limited the number of covered hospital days, did not violate Section 504 since a policy that has a disparate impact on individuals with disabilities does not necessarily create a prima facie case of discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act). 91 choice exams to accommodate his learning disability. 97 The court deferred to the University's academic judgment that modifying multiple-choice examinations did not constitute a reasonable accommodation. 98 While the court ultimately decided in favor of the University, the case did clarify the notion that a university must fully defend its grounds for revoking admission of a student with a disability. The Interpretive Guidelines for the ADA, drafted by the Department of Justice ("DOJ") and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") point out that,
given the similarities between Section 504 and the ADA, many of the statutory interpretations of Section 504 can be used in evaluating the ADA. 99 Therefore, the decisions made in Davis, Alexander, and Wynne may apply to the ADA as well.
IV. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990
The purpose of the ADA is "to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities." 100 Perhaps the greatest achievement of the ADA is its extension of disability rights to the private sector. This corrected a fundamental flaw in the government's efforts to bring people with disabilities into mainstream society-a goal that Section 504's limited scope was inherently unable to achieve. As John J.
Sarno points out,
The primary intent of the ADA is to eradicate day-to-day discrimination against persons with disabilities. The ADA represents an attempt to legislate comprehensive social policy by barring attitudinal as well as environmental barriers. Such an effort demonstrates a society working to transform itself by striking a balance between the morality of the marketplace and the imperative of equal opportunity. In contrast, critics of the ADA see it as an effort on the part of Congress simply to privatize the expense of accommodating people with disabilities.
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A. Administrative and Judicial Enforcement
It is important to ensure not only a strong, well-funded, and capable infrastructure to enforce the ADA, but also a staff knowledgeable and supportive of its statutory goal of eliminating discrimination against individuals with disabilities. Ultimately, neither Congress nor the judiciary is capable of legislating a change in attitudes towards people with disabilities.
Laura Rothstein notes that institutions of "[h]igher education had evolved practices, policies, and procedures before other sectors affected by the ADA (with the exception of K-12 education)." 103 Society-wide, integration is at best a precursor to acceptance. It is not acceptance itself. Carrie Basas notes that, "the daily struggle of managing other people's reactions to and stereotypes about disability can become a job in itself."
104 She goes on to point out that, When "reasonable accommodation" is bandied about, minds ultimately turn to a list of tangible tools, equipment, and changes in the physical environment such as large-screen monitors, curb cuts, automatic doors . . . . without considering the combined effects of impairments, the cultural weight of disability, and the longterm impact of societal inaccessibility.
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Enforcement of established civil rights and clear guidelines as to what those rights entail are essential to eliminate discrimination. The legislature must adequately fund and staff enforcement entities. This legislative approach, however, is not always sufficient in confronting the problem of clarifying the language of the ADA. Courts must play the important role of 102 Id. at 412. 103 Rothstein, supra note 6, at 863 (noting that, "Colleges and universities also followed the admonition in Southeastern Community College v. Davis that: 'Technological advances can be expected to enhance opportunities to rehabilitate the handicapped or otherwise to qualify them for some useful employment. Such advances also may enable attainment of these goals without imposing undue financial and administrative burdens upon a State.'"). 104 Carrie Griffin Basas, The New Boys: Women with Disabilities and the Legal Profession, 25 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 32, 57 (2010). 105 Id. at 60-61.
making statutory interpretations that are consistent with the legislative intent of eradicating discrimination. Assessing the ADA depends, in part, on what one interprets its mandate to be.
Thus far, however, a great deal of the ADA analysis has remained at the initial level of determining whether the individual can even qualify as having a "disability." One area in which this has been difficult has been for post-secondary students with learning disabilities. As Wendy Hensel notes,
[t]he problem for most students in higher education, particularly those in graduate or professional school, is that they have attained a level of educational achievement which surpasses the majority of Americans. Some large cities have nearly 50% of their students drop out of high school with no diploma, and nationally less than one-third of all adults attain college degrees. There is abundant evidence that the average person cannot read at a high school level, let alone at a collegiate one. 106 The following case exemplifies the ongoing struggle that law students continue to face with regard to seeking reasonable accommodations on bar examinations.
B. The Bartlett Case
In EXAMINATION (1993) . This supports the district court's rejection of the Board's claim that the bar examination was intended to be a reading test in the Bartlett case. The district court found that "speed in reading is not tested by the Bar Examination, nor is speed in reading one of the essential functions of lawyering." Bartlett, 970 F.Supp. at 1128. The court held that the Board was "estopped from arguing that the Bar Examination is intended to test either reading or the ability to perform tasks under time constraints." Id. In reaching this conclusion, the court pointed out that "numerous accommodations, including time extensions are granted every year to persons whose physical impairments make it difficult visually to read, including persons who are blind." Id. at 1130. The simple fact that there are blind members of the Bar indicates that the bar examination does not require a visual ability to read. 113 Id. at 1114. 114 Id. 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
The legal community should promote the understanding that lawyering is just as much about coming up with creative legal arguments as it is about being able to read quickly. The real question should be whether the person who wishes to be a lawyer has the analytical and creative skills to contribute to the profession. We do not ask people whether they can walk the fifteen miles it might take to get to work each morning. We recognize that with the use of a car they can arrive at work on time. Frequently, disabilities can be reasonably accommodated. Reasonable accommodation of a learning disability offers a useful sliver of the disability debate with which to assess the powerful role that the ADAAA can play in restoring the civil rights of people with disabilities. The ADAAA's clarification of definitions applies to both the ADA and to the Rehabilitation Act giving students generally and law students with learning disabilities in particular clear rights to reasonable accommodations that help them read, concentrate, and learn. While the ADAAA did not need to strengthen "reasonable accommodation" language under the ADA since it was already a very comprehensive framework, this article recommends that federal disability legislation's broad "reasonable accommodation" provisions be implemented without further delay.
Litigation may turn on nuanced hardship analyses 134 but general recognition should be forthcoming that, as the EEOC explains, "most accommodations can be provided at little or no cost." 135 Mastroianni goes on to address the important role of law schools in following through on the ADA's mandate:
I think it's important for us to take a step back and look at how wrong the United States Supreme Court and the lower federal courts were in interpreting this law. What are we not getting across in legal education that's enabling judges and enabling attorneys who are working with these laws to understand that, yes, the definition of "disability" is broad; that yes, it's a remedial civil rights statute and it should be interpreted broadly. plaintiff, a third-year medical student, was diagnosed with a reading disorder early in life and had received accommodations throughout his academic career). The Jenkins case did not resolve the balancing between academic standards and reasonable accommodations. See also Hensel, supra note 107, at 672, 684 (noting further that, "[t]he ADAAA will undoubtedly expand eligibility for students with disabilities in elementary and secondary school seeking accommodations pursuant to § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. This may prove to be problematic for schools, particularly in the context of children with learning disabilities. The newly liberal § 504 eligibility standards are in tension with the restrictive threshold interpretation that some courts and administrative hearing officers have given to learning disabilities under IDEA. This conflict has the potential to result in confusion for administrators and the inconsistent treatment of similarly situated children."). disability. We have a great deal of work yet to do to embrace individuals who have disabilities on a participatory level.
IDEA did succeed in ending the exclusion of students with disabilities from public school, providing a range of special education programs, and giving schools incentives to increase their provisions for children with disabilities. In return for complying with federal statutory mandates, Congress provides states with partial funding. Therefore, if states offer special education services within certain specifications, they can receive federal aid. While this has helped schools create programs, it has also distorted the identification process. As a result, the labeling process sometimes drives services. Separating special education services from funding mechanisms, however, would dismantle the equilibrium of incentives. If IDEA were not funded, schools would have inefficient incentives to provide services. That is to say, schools would have a strong incentive to avoid identifying students with disabilities. If IDEA were fully funded, however, there would be no incentive to make sure the costs of the service were worthwhile to the special needs child. In this way, IDEA enables change by providing new resources, but the change is bound by the limitations of these resources.
If enough states increase the standard of educational services provided to children with disabilities, then the Supreme Court may overturn the Rowley precedent. The paradox of compensation, however, illustrates that the latter would simply reverse incentives-still leaving one party with the incentive to be inefficient in analyzing the costs and benefits of providing special education services. Proportional quality programming, on the other hand, can alleviate the tension created by establishing individualized rights for one disadvantaged group by evaluating those rights in relation to legitimate goals of the system in which those rights must be provided. The success of a quality approach, however, depends on decision-makers' ability to remain committed to establishing protective rights for special needs children without allowing these rights to preempt those of non-disabled children. In this way, we can go beyond simply allowing every child to occupy a chair in the classroom to providing each child the opportunity to learn.
What happens, however, when students who are over the age of twenty-one try to request accommodations in undergraduate and graduate programs? Higher education is becoming an essential credential in a competitive market place. IDEA, however, no longer protects these students' rights to special accommodations. Ultimately, individual biases cannot be eliminated through legislation. However, when those personal misconceptions affect an individual's ability to pursue their legal right to equal education and access to professional entrance examinations, then it is society's responsibility to end such institutionalized discrimination.
In our society, we need to recognize how dangerous it is to set aside individuals who are unable to conform to a given mold no matter how economically or socially efficient restricted access may appear. In Rawls' theory of justice, individuals are put in a room without knowing where in society they would return. 139 They are deprived of a sense of history and thus do not know whether they were a minority group in the past or will be so in the future. This veil of ignorance takes away all cultural and historical perspective. Rawls first tenet, that there would be a maximum level of liberty, would ensure that each person has as much liberty as possible as long as everyone else has the same level of liberty. His second tenet that social and economic inequalities would be arranged in accordance with the greatest benefit of the least advantaged and that positions would be open to all ensures equal opportunity. In predicting what maxims people would create for society, Rawls points out that no one would want to be on the bottom.
140
139 RAWLS, supra note 11. 140 Id.
People would decide to make everyone equal-thus, maximizing the benefit of the least advantaged in order to raise them up to the same level as those who are already advantaged.
While Rawls does not provide a historical account of how people have gone about protecting civil rights, his theory of justice provides a useful philosophical rational for granting such rights. Like any model, there are problems with thinking that reality will correspond perfectly with such a hypothetical state of society. Lack of exposure and understanding of disabilities in general can skew people's commitment to providing a sufficient safety net in the area of disability protection. A substantial body of litigation provides evidence of this lack of commitment. Furthermore, there are some disabilities to which people do not believe they would be susceptible. Ignorance and irrational discounting of personal risk can lead to an insufficient level of disability protection.
There are disabilities that tend not to develop until later in a person's life. Despite the fact that learning disabilities can result from severe head injuries, people who do not already have a learning disability generally do not believe that they are susceptible to such a condition.
Thus, applying Rawls decision-making model to accommodating the needs of people with learning disabilities may not work as well as applying the theory to accommodating a condition to which people feel more susceptible. The scenario is complicated by the level of ignorance about the hidden nature of learning disabilities vis-a-vis the more obvious needs of someone who uses a wheel chair. Reality appears to only reflect half of a Rawlsian model. While we do not know what will occur in the future, we are not blind to the past or to present hierarchies of physical and mental aptitude. Nor do we set aside the existing distribution of wealth when deciding whether to pay for civil rights measures for people with disabilities. Within this middle ground lies a substantial opportunity to carry out the full intent of Congress in passing federal
